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ABSTRACT—Throughout his time on the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul 
Stevens consistently took the “strict separationist” approach to the 
Establishment Clause. This led him to write and join opinions that stated 
that the Establishment Clause is violated by religious activity in public 
schools, by religious symbols on government property, and by government 
support for parochial schools that could be used for religious education. 
Justice Stevens adhered to these views throughout his thirty-five years on 
the Court. Although the strict separationist approach was the dominant view 
on the Court for several decades, those appointed after Justice Stevens 
rarely held this view. Some, like Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and 
Stephen Breyer, believe that the government violates the Establishment 
Clause only if it symbolically endorses religion or a particular religion. 
Others, like Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence 
Thomas, believe that little violates the Establishment Clause: the 
government acts unconstitutionally only if it literally establishes a church or 
coerces religious participation. The result is that, while Justice Stevens 
remained consistent, the Justices around him became much more 
conservative on this issue. Justice Stevens’s approach to the Establishment 
Clause has great virtues in protecting freedom of conscience and providing 
inclusiveness in a religiously pluralistic society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2005, I argued Van Orden v. Perry1 before the Supreme 
Court. The case involved the constitutionality of a six-foot high, three-foot 
wide monument of the Ten Commandments that sits exactly at the corner 
between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court.2 As I 
prepared for the oral argument, I knew that Justice John Paul Stevens would 
likely vote to declare the monument unconstitutional as violating the 
Establishment Clause. Throughout his time on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Stevens had been a consistent vote and voice for a wall separating church 
and state. I also knew that, no matter what, Justice Stevens would treat 
every advocate with decency and respect. Although he had a laser-like 
ability to get to the heart of the case and ask the most difficult questions, he 
always did so without rancor or sarcasm and in the best possible tone of 
intellectual engagement. 
The argument went as I expected, but the ultimate result surprised me. 
The Court voted 5–4 to uphold the monument, which I certainly regarded as 
possible, but with Justice Breyer concurring in the judgment and providing 
the critical fifth vote.3 As I, and everyone, predicted, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas voted to uphold the 
monument. 
Had the case been argued when Justice Stevens came on the bench in 
1975, I have no doubt that it would have come out the other way. At that 
time, a majority of the Court continued to believe in the strict separation of 
church and state. It was just four years after the Court decided Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,4 which has been described as embodying this strict separationist 
approach to the Establishment Clause.5 On the other hand, if the case were 
argued today, I think I would have little chance of prevailing. The 
 
1  545 U.S. 677 (2005) (permitting Ten Commandments display at the Texas State Capitol). 
2  Id. at 681. 
3  Id. at 681, 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
4  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
5  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 236–
37 (1994) (describing strict separation as the dominant theory of the Establishment Clause until 1980). 
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replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito means that there now 
are five Justices who are likely to find that little violates the Establishment 
Clause.6 
Justice Stevens came on to the Court as a moderate Republican and 
was perceived as a moderate justice, but by the time he retired he was 
perceived as a strong liberal voice.7 Upon his retirement, there was much 
discussion as to whether Justice Stevens changed over his thirty-five years 
on the Supreme Court or whether the Court changed around him. 
Undoubtedly, it was some of both. In some areas, such as affirmative 
action, Justice Stevens changed over time.8 But in the area of the 
Establishment Clause, it was not Justice Stevens who changed, but the 
Justices around him. From the time he came on to the Court, Justice Stevens 
always voted to enforce a strict separation of church and state. This was the 
majority view when he arrived as a Justice and the dissenting view when he 
retired. 
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes Justice Stevens’s 
strict separationist approach to the Establishment Clause. Part II explains 
how the Court shifted during Justice Stevens’s tenure there. Finally, Part III 
briefly argues that Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause was right and expresses hope that someday the Court will return to 
his views on the important and recurring issue of how the Establishment 
Clause should be interpreted. 
I. JUSTICE STEVENS AS A STRICT SEPARATIONIST 
The strict separationist approach to the Establishment Clause holds 
that, to the greatest extent possible, government and religion should be 
separated. Government should be, as much as possible, secular; religion 
should be entirely in the private realm of society. This theory is perhaps 
best described by Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor that there should be a wall 
separating church and state.9 As the Supreme Court declared in Everson v. 
 
6  There have been two Establishment Clause cases during the Roberts Court Era and both have 
ruled in favor of the government by 5–4 margins. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. 
Ct. 1436 (2011) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge a tax credit program that benefited religious 
schools); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (reversing lower court decision that held a large 
cross in the Mojave Desert violated the Establishment Clause). 
7  See Robert Barnes, Justice Stevens to Step Down, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1; Jeffrey 
Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, at 50. 
8  Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 475, 485–86 (1989) (invalidating an 
affirmative action program with Justice Stevens in the majority), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 311, 343–44 (2003) (upholding an affirmative action program with Justice Stevens in the majority). 
9  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee of the 
Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
WRITINGS 510, 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of 
the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation 
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Board of Education: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between 
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.”10 
Justice Brennan articulated the justifications for this approach when he 
wrote: 
The first, which is most closely related to the more general conceptions of 
liberty found in the remainder of the First Amendment, is to guarantee the 
individual right to conscience. . . . 
 . . . . 
The second purpose of separation and neutrality is to keep the state from 
interfering in the essential autonomy of religious life, either by taking upon 
itself the decision of religious issues, or by unduly involving itself in the 
supervision of religious institutions or officials. 
The third purpose of separation and neutrality is to prevent the trivialization 
and degradation of religion by too close an attachment to the organs of 
government. . . . 
Finally, the principles of separation and neutrality help assure that essentially 
religious issues, precisely because of their importance and sensitivity, not 
become the occasion for battle in the political arena.11 
In every case, Justice Stevens adhered to the strict separationist 
approach.12 Interestingly, he wrote relatively few majority opinions, but was 
a consistent vote in the many Establishment Clause cases during his long 
tenure on the Supreme Court. To be more specific, there were three key 
tenets to Justice Stevens’s approach to the Establishment Clause. He 
consistently voted and expressed the views that the Establishment Clause is 
violated by religious activities in public schools, by religious symbols on 
government property, and by government aid to parochial schools that can 
be used for religious education. 
A. Religious Activities in Public Schools 
First, Justice Stevens espoused the belief that government-sponsored 
religious activities in public schools violate the Establishment Clause. Thus, 
in Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion with 
Justice Stevens in the majority, declared unconstitutional a state law that 
required the Ten Commandments to be posted on the walls of every public 
 
between church and State.”). 
10  330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
11  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803–05 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
12  One possible exception to this is Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, where Justice 
Stevens wrote the majority opinion dismissing a challenge to the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance as violating the Establishment Clause in public schools. 542 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004). The Court 
dismissed the challenge, however, for lack of standing. Id. 
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school classroom.13 The Court concluded that the law “had no secular 
legislative purpose” and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.14 
Similarly, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court invalidated a state law that 
authorized public school teachers to hold a one-minute period of silence for 
meditation or voluntary prayer.15 Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and 
concluded that the purpose behind the law was to reintroduce prayer into 
public schools and deemed the law unconstitutional because it “was not 
motivated by any clearly secular purpose—indeed, the statute had no 
secular purpose.”16 
In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court followed this reasoning and ruled 
unconstitutional a state law that required that public schools that teach 
evolution also teach “creation science.”17 The Court explained that “creation 
science” is a religious theory explaining the origin of human life, and 
concluded: “[B]ecause the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to 
endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation 
of the Establishment Clause.”18 Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion 
written by Justice Brennan. 
In Lee v. Weisman, the Court declared unconstitutional clergy-
delivered prayers at public school graduations.19 Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the Court, held that such prayers are inherently coercive because there is 
great pressure on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and not to 
leave during the prayers.20 
Justice Stevens also joined Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion that 
emphasized that the Establishment Clause can be violated even without 
coercion. Justice Blackmun remarked that “it is not enough that the 
government restrain from compelling religious practices[;] [i]t must not 
engage in them either.”21 Justice Stevens joined Justice Souter’s concurring 
opinion as well. That opinion stressed that coercion is sufficient for a 
finding of an Establishment Clause violation, but it is not necessary; 
Establishment Clause violations exist without coercion if there is symbolic 
government endorsement of religion.22 
 
13  449 U.S. 39, 41, 42–43 (1980) (per curiam). 
14  Id. at 41. 
15  472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985). 
16  Id. at 56. 
17  482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987). 
18  Id. at 593–94. 
19  505 U.S. 577, 580–81 (1992); id. at 599 (“The sole question presented is whether a religious 
exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where . . . young graduates who 
object are induced to conform.”). 
20  Id. at 593. Justice Stevens joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, though he also joined Justice 
Blackmun’s concurring opinion. 
21  Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
22  Id. at 618–19 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe, which held that student-delivered prayers at high 
school football games violated the Establishment Clause.23 A public high 
school in Texas had a tradition of having a student deliver a prayer before 
varsity football games. The school claimed that the student prayers were 
private speech but the Court emphatically disagreed. Justice Stevens 
explained: “[W]e are not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be 
regarded as ‘private speech.’ These invocations are authorized by a 
government policy and take place on government property at government-
sponsored school-related events.”24 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, 
emphasized that the school had encouraged and facilitated the prayer at an 
official school event.25 The Court noted that the school encouraged the 
delivery of prayers, both in its official policies and in its traditional support 
for prayer at football games.26 The result was both actual and likely 
perceived government endorsement of religion. 
Justice Stevens also noted the coercive aspect of the school’s policy: 
many students—football players, band members, and cheerleaders—were 
required to be present in order to receive academic credit.27 He wrote that 
forcing students to choose between attending the game and avoiding 
religion itself violated the Establishment Clause: 
The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this 
difficult choice upon these students for “[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment 
that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and 
benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious 
practice.”28 
It is notable that Justice Stevens’s majority opinion avoided choosing 
among the theories of the Establishment Clause; he explained why the 
prayers failed scrutiny under any of the leading tests.29 Justice Stevens 
obviously was aware that there was no consensus among the Justices as to 
the appropriate theory of the Establishment Clause, so he wrote the opinion 
in a manner that explained the result under each of the major approaches to 
the provision. 
B. Religious Symbols on Government Property 
Second, Justice Stevens consistently voted to find that religious 
symbols on government property violate the Establishment Clause. In 
 
23  530 U.S. 290, 315–17 (2000). 
24  Id. at 302. 
25  See id. at 297–98, 302. 
26  Id. at 309. 
27  See id. at 311–12. 
28  Id. at 312 (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). 
29  Id. at 310–17. 
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Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice Stevens dissented from a decision that upheld the 
constitutionality of a municipal-sponsored nativity scene in a park.30 Justice 
Stevens joined two dissenting opinions, one by Justice Brennan and one by 
Justice Blackmun.31 
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a nativity scene put in a stairway display case of a 
county courthouse and of a menorah placed in front of a city building.32 The 
Court ruled 6–3 that the menorah was constitutional, but 5–4 that the 
nativity scene was unconstitutional. Justice Stevens, together with Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, concluded that both symbols on government 
property violated the Establishment Clause.33 Four of the Justices—Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy—would have 
upheld both symbols.34 The key to the outcome was that Justices Blackmun 
and O’Connor saw the nativity scene as violating the Establishment Clause 
because the display of a religious symbol of only one religion on 
government property was an impermissible symbolic endorsement, while 
they allowed the menorah because it was part of an overall holiday 
display.35 
In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, Justice Stevens 
wrote a powerful dissent to a decision that upheld the Ku Klux Klan’s 
placing of a large Latin cross in a public park across from the Ohio State 
Capitol.36 The Supreme Court, without a majority opinion, held that the 
state government’s attempt to exclude the cross was unconstitutional 
discrimination against religious speech.37 Justice Scalia wrote the plurality 
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice 
Thomas. He emphasized that the First Amendment’s protection of speech 
includes religious expression and concluded that excluding the cross was 
impermissible content-based discrimination.38 Justice O’Connor concurred 
in part and concurred in the judgment, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer. 
Justice O’Connor wrote that the key question was whether allowing the 
 
30  465 U.S. 668, 726 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court’s decision implicitly leaves open questions concerning the constitutionality of the public 
display on public property of a crèche standing alone, or the public display of other distinctively 
religious symbols such as a cross.” (emphasis added)). But see id. at 671 (majority opinion) (“The 
display [was] situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the 
shopping district.”). 
31  Id. at 694–95 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
32  492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989).  
33  Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
34  Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
35  Id. at 620–21 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 627, 635–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
36  515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37  Id. at 760–63 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion). 
38  Id. 
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cross would be perceived, by the reasonable observer, as government 
symbolic endorsement of religion.39 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. Justice Stevens, in his 
dissent, argued for a strong presumption against allowing such religious 
symbols on government property.40 He also criticized Justice O’Connor’s 
focus on the reasonable observer and said that the Establishment Clause 
was violated because “[t]he ‘reasonable observer’ of any symbol placed 
unattended in front of any capitol in the world will normally assume that the 
sovereign—which is not only the owner of that parcel of real estate but also 
the lawgiver for the surrounding territory—has sponsored and facilitated its 
message.”41 
Pinette is illustrative because it reveals the divisions on the Court 
regarding the Establishment Clause. Justice Scalia and the plurality do not 
see a constitutional problem with religious symbols on government 
property, so they saw the exclusion of the cross as a content-based 
restriction of speech. Justice O’Connor focused on whether the religious 
symbol was a government endorsement of religion. But Justice Stevens saw 
all religious symbols on government property as an affront to the 
Establishment Clause and used his dissent in Pinette to reject the Court’s 
movement towards a symbolic endorsement test. 
In 2005, the Court considered two cases concerning Ten 
Commandments displays on government property: McCreary County v. 
ACLU42 and Van Orden v. Perry.43 In McCreary County, the Court, in a 5–4 
decision, ruled that Ten Commandments displays in Kentucky county 
courthouses were unconstitutional because the government had the 
impermissible purpose of advancing religion.44 The counties were clear that 
they wanted the Ten Commandments posted because of the religious 
content and significance of the Decalogue.45 Justice Stevens joined Justice 
Souter’s majority opinion holding this unconstitutional. 
As discussed in the Introduction above, in Van Orden, the Court, in a 
5–4 decision without a majority opinion, upheld the constitutionality of a 
six-foot high, three-foot wide Ten Commandments monument that sits 
between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court.46 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas and declared that a government may place religious 
 
39  Id. at 773 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
40  Id. at 799–802 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41  Id. at 801–02. 
42  545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
43  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
44  545 U.S. at 868–70. 
45  Id. at 870. 
46  545 U.S. at 681, 691–92. 
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symbols on government property.47 Justice Breyer concurred in the 
judgment and stressed that the presence of the monument for over forty 
years, the surrounding secular displays and monuments, and the fact that the 
monument was donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles all convinced him 
that the state government was not impermissibly symbolically endorsing 
religion.48 
Justice Stevens wrote a powerful dissenting opinion: “In my judgment, 
at the very least, the Establishment Clause has created a strong presumption 
against the display of religious symbols on public property.”49 He wrote: “If 
any fragment of Jefferson’s metaphorical ‘wall of separation between 
church and State’ is to be preserved—if there remains any meaning to the 
‘wholesome “neutrality” of which this Court’s [Establishment Clause] cases 
speak’—a negative answer to that question [of whether the monument is 
allowed] is mandatory.”50 
Justice Stevens concluded his dissenting opinion by declaring: 
The judgment of the Court in this case stands for the proposition that the 
Constitution permits governmental displays of sacred religious texts. This 
makes a mockery of the constitutional ideal that government must remain 
neutral between religion and irreligion. If a State may endorse a particular 
deity’s command to “have no other gods before me,” it is difficult to conceive 
of any textual display that would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.51 
Justice Stevens’s last opinion in an Establishment Clause case was also 
a dissent. In Salazar v. Buono, the Court, in a 5–4 decision without a 
majority opinion, reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that held a large cross in 
a federal park in the Mojave Desert as violative of the Establishment 
Clause.52 After a federal district court and the Ninth Circuit held the cross to 
be unconstitutional, Congress passed a law transferring ownership of the 
small parcel of land where the cross is located to a private veterans’ group.53 
The district court concluded that this was a sham transfer, and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.54 Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court in 
an opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Justice 
Kennedy held that the lower courts had not adequately considered whether 
the federal statute transferring ownership was a basis for modifying the 
injunction to remove the cross.55 Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in 
the judgment and would have concluded that no one had standing to 
 
47  Id. at 691–92. 
48  Id. at 701–02 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
49  Id. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
50  Id. (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
51  Id. at 735. 
52  130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010). 
53  Id. at 1813. 
54  Id. at 1814. 
55  Id. at 1819–20. 
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challenge the cross on government property.56 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor. He explained: 
“The Establishment Clause, if nothing else, prohibits government from 
‘specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, 
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ.’” A Latin cross 
necessarily symbolizes one of the most important tenets upon which believers 
in a benevolent Creator, as well as nonbelievers, are known to differ. In my 
view, the District Court was right to enforce its prior judgment by enjoining 
Congress’ proposed remedy—a remedy that was engineered to leave the cross 
intact and that did not alter its basic meaning. I certainly agree that the Nation 
should memorialize the service of those who fought and died in World War I, 
but it cannot lawfully do so by continued endorsement of a starkly sectarian 
message.57 
Over the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has become 
increasingly willing to allow religious symbols on government property. 
Justice Stevens, however, was consistent throughout his time on the Court 
in believing that religious symbols on government property violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
C. Government Aid to Parochial Schools 
Third and finally, Justice Stevens believed that government aid to 
parochial schools should be limited and that the government should not be 
able to provide aid to parochial schools that could be used for religious 
instruction. The shift in the Court on this issue during Justice Stevens’s 
tenure is clearly evidenced in the Court’s decisions in Aguilar v. Felton58 
and Agostini v. Felton.59 In Aguilar, Justice Stevens joined Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion, which held that it violates the Establishment 
Clause for a government to send remedial education teachers on to 
parochial school premises to provide instruction.60 But twelve years later, in 
Agostini, a 5–4 decision in which Justice Stevens joined Justice Souter’s 
dissenting opinion, the Court overruled Aguilar and eliminated the rigid 
rule preventing government subsidies of teachers in religious schools.61 
In Mitchell v. Helms, another case indicative of the Court’s shift in 
views as to the Establishment Clause, the Court held that the government 
could give instructional equipment to parochial schools so long as it was 
 
56  Id. at 1824–25 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57  Id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 
718 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting))). 
58  473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
59  521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
60  473 U.S. at 404–06, 414. 
61  521 U.S. at 208–09, 240. 
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not used in religious education.62 Earlier, in Meek v. Pittenger, the Court 
declared unconstitutional a state law that provided instructional materials, 
including “maps, charts, and laboratory equipment” to parochial schools.63 
But in Mitchell, the Court expressly overruled Meek.64 
Mitchell involved Louisiana’s providing instructional equipment, 
including “computers, and computer software, and also slide and movie 
projectors, overhead projectors, television sets, tape recorders, VCR’s, 
projection screens, laboratory equipment, maps, globes, filmstrips, slides, 
and cassette recordings” to parochial schools.65 Justice Thomas, writing for 
a plurality of four, said that the aid should be allowed because it is provided 
equally to all schools, religious and nonreligious.66 Justice Thomas 
emphatically rejected the view that a government cannot give aid that is 
actually used for religious education. He also sharply criticized the 
traditional law preventing the government from giving aid to “pervasively 
sectarian” institutions.67 He said that this phrase was born of anti-Catholic 
bigotry and wrote that “hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has 
a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow.”68 
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined 
by Justice Breyer, in which she sharply disagreed with Justice Thomas’s 
approach. Justice O’Connor said that equality never had been the sole 
measure of whether government action violated the Establishment Clause: 
“[W]e have never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional 
muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for 
distributing aid.”69 She continued: “I also disagree with the plurality’s 
conclusion that actual diversion of government aid to religious 
indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment Clause.”70 Justice 
O’Connor wrote that the test should be whether aid actually is used for 
religious instruction, in which case the Establishment Clause is violated.71 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, urged the Court to adhere to its precedents and find that aid is 
impermissible when it is of a type, like instructional materials, that can be 
used for religious education. Justice Souter began by observing: 
The establishment prohibition of government religious funding serves more 
than one end. It is meant to guarantee the right of individual conscience against 
 
62  530 U.S. 793, 829–32 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion). 
63  421 U.S. 349, 365–66 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
64  530 U.S. at 808 (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion). 
65  Id. at 803. 
66  Id. at 829–32. 
67  Id. at 828. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 837–39 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
70  Id. at 840. 
71  Id. at 837–38, 845–44. 
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compulsion, to protect the integrity of religion against the corrosion of secular 
support, and to preserve the unity of political society against the implied 
exclusion of the less favored and the antagonism of controversy over public 
support for religious causes.72 
He strongly disagreed with the plurality’s view that equality is the sole 
test for a violation of the Establishment Clause and identified a number of 
factors that prior cases require to be considered in determining whether aid 
is impermissible. 
Although Justice Stevens did not write this dissent, it was consistent 
with the position that he had taken throughout his time on the Supreme 
Court concerning limits on government aid to parochial schools and, more 
generally, on the need for a wall separating church and state. 
Indeed, it is striking that throughout his time on the Court, Justice 
Stevens was consistent in adhering to a strict separationist approach to the 
Establishment Clause. He always voted that the Establishment Clause is 
violated by religious activities in public schools, by religious symbols on 
government property, and by government aid to parochial schools. 
II. THE SHIFTING COURT 
From 1975, when Justice Stevens joined the Court, until 2010, when he 
retired, the Court’s views on the Establishment Clause changed greatly. In 
1947, when the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education that the 
Establishment Clause applied to the states, all nine Justices expressed belief 
in the idea of a strict separation of church and state and the wall of 
separation articulated by Thomas Jefferson.73 As Professor Ira Lupu has 
persuasively explained, this was the dominant theory of the Establishment 
Clause from 1947 until 1980.74 With Justice O’Connor’s arrival and her 
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, an alternative theory developed: A 
government violates the Establishment Clause only if it symbolically 
endorses religion or a particular religion.75 Justice Scalia’s arrival 
introduced a forceful voice for rejecting any notion of a wall separating 
church and state and finding that the government violates the Establishment 
Clause only if it literally establishes a church or coerces religious 
participation.76 
Thus, in 1989, when the Court decided County of Allegheny v. ACLU,77 
the Justices were divided among these three views. Three Justices—Justices 
 
72  Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
73  See 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
74  See Lupu, supra note 5. 
75  465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). For an early criticism of this approach, see William P. Marshall, “We 
Know It when We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986). 
76  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640–42 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
77  492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
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Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens—took the strict separationist view. Two 
Justices—Justices Blackmun and O’Connor—used the symbolic 
endorsement test. Four Justices—Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices 
White, Scalia, and Kennedy—took the accommodationist approach. This 
explained the 4–2–3 split on the Court as to the constitutionality of two 
religious symbols on government property that it considered. 
Two years later, Justice Clarence Thomas replaced Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, providing a fifth vote for the accommodationist approach. 
However, in Lee v. Weisman, in 1992, the Court failed to produce a 
majority opinion for this view of the Establishment Clause, although five of 
the Justices took this approach.78 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices 
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter, found that clergy-delivered 
prayers at public school graduations violated the Establishment Clause.79 
Although Justice Kennedy focused on the inherently coercive nature of the 
prayers, the other Justices in the majority joined separate concurring 
opinions, stating that an Establishment Clause violation could exist even 
without a finding of coercion.80 
In 1993, Justice Ginsburg, a strict separationist, replaced Justice Byron 
White, who had always taken the accommodationist approach.81 In 1994, 
Justice Breyer, who has taken the symbolic endorsement approach, replaced 
Justice Blackmun, who also took this approach.82 Thus, in 2000, when 
Mitchell v. Helms came before the Court, it was not surprising that the 
Court split 4–2–383 as it had in County of Allegheny. Justice Thomas, joined 
by the other accommodationists—Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, 
and Justice Kennedy—voted to allow government aid to parochial schools 
to be used for religious education.84 Justices O’Connor and Breyer would 
have allowed the state government to give instructional equipment to 
parochial schools so long as the equipment was not used in religious 
instruction.85 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented and would 
 
78  See 505 U.S. at 577. 
79  Id. at 580–81, 599. 
80  Compare id. at 599 (“No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a 
student to participate in a religious exercise.”), with id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“It is not 
enough that the government restrain from compelling religious practices: It must not engage in them 
either. The Court repeatedly has recognized that a violation of the Establishment Clause is not 
predicated on coercion.” (citation omitted)), and id. at 618 (Souter, J., concurring) (“Over the years, this 
Court has declared the invalidity of many noncoercive state laws and practices conveying a message of 
religious endorsement.”). 
81  See, e.g., id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Scalia’s dissent); Cnty. of Allegheny, 
492 U.S. at 655 (joining Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion). 
82  See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578 (plurality opinion) (writing the plurality opinion of 
the Court). 
83  530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
84  See id. at 801. 
85  Id. at 836–37 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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have adhered to prior decisions holding that such instructional equipment is 
not allowed because it could be used for religious instruction.86 
The departures of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005 and Justice 
O’Connor in 2006 moved the Court further to the right, both on the 
Establishment Clause and more generally. Chief Justice John Roberts, 
replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not alter the Court’s ideology; it is 
hard to identify any case where Chief Justice Roberts voted differently from 
how Chief Justice Rehnquist likely would have voted. But Justice Alito 
replacing Justice O’Connor is crucial on a host of issues, including the 
Establishment Clause. There are likely now five votes for the 
accommodationist position that Justice Scalia long has championed87 and 
that Justice Stevens vehemently rejected. The simple reality is that Justice 
Stevens remained consistent in views of the Establishment Clause over his 
thirty-five-year tenure on the Court, but the Justices around him changed 
and moved the Court significantly further to the right and away from 
viewing the Establishment Clause as creating a wall separating church and 
state. 
III. JUSTICE STEVENS WAS RIGHT 
Obviously, this Essay does not allow space for a full development of a 
defense of Justice Stevens’s view that the Establishment Clause provides a 
wall that separates church and state. But I would be remiss if I were purely 
descriptive and did not attempt to briefly defend his position. 
There are many reasons why separating church and state is so vital. 
First, the Establishment Clause protects freedom of conscience by ensuring 
that the government is not aligned with a particular religion, or even with 
religion generally. A government identified with a specific faith inevitably 
causes people to feel pressure, sometimes subtle and sometimes overt, to 
conform their religious beliefs and practices. 
Separating church and state means that people will not be not be taxed 
to support religions other than their own. The famous statement of Thomas 
Jefferson concerning the need for a wall separating church and state, and 
James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, were made in the context of opposing a state tax to aid the 
church.88 It is wrong to make me support a church that teaches that my 
religion or my beliefs are wrong or even evil. It violates my freedom of 
conscience to force me to support religions that I do not accept. Justice 
Souter explained that “compelling an individual to support religion violates 
 
86  Id. at 867–69 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
87  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640–42 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
88  See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870–73 (Souter, J., dissenting) (referencing Jefferson’s and Madison’s 
views). 
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the fundamental principle of freedom of conscience. Madison’s and 
Jefferson’s now familiar words establish clearly that liberty of personal 
conviction requires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this 
means that the government can compel no aid to fund it.”89 
Second, the Establishment Clause serves a fundamental purpose of 
inclusion in that it allows all in society, those of every religion and those of 
no religion, to feel tied to a representative government. When government 
practices support religion, inescapably those of different religions feel 
excluded. When a government is overtly aligned with religion, those of 
different faiths, or those who do not identify with particular beliefs, 
inevitably feel that they are in the wrong place—that they are outsiders with 
regard to their government. 
Treating all religions equally does not solve this. In a society that is 
overwhelmingly Christian, those of minority faiths feel marginalized and 
unwelcome when religion is overtly a part of government practice. If 
treating all religions equally were the only constraint imposed by the 
Establishment Clause, a school could begin each day with a prayer so long 
as every religion got its due. If a school reflected America’s religious 
diversity, the vast majority of days would begin with Christian prayers. 
Those with no religion would be made to feel that it was not their school, as 
would those of minority religions who routinely were subjected to prayers 
of Christian faiths. 
This goal of inclusion is central, not incidental, to the Establishment 
Clause. Justice O’Connor has explained: “Direct government action 
endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid . . . because it 
‘sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members 
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that 
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.’”90 
Consider the most blatant violation of the Establishment Clause: A city 
or state declares a particular religion, say Catholicism, to be the official 
religion. Assuming that the government took no additional actions to limit 
free exercise by those of other faiths, why is such a declaration 
unacceptable? The pronouncement that there is an official religion makes 
all of a different faith feel unwelcome. They are made to feel that they are 
tolerated guests, not equal members of the community. Just as bad, those of 
the favored religion are made to feel that they are special members of the 
community. In Justice O’Connor’s words, non-adherents are made to feel 
like outsiders and adherents are made to feel like insiders. 
The very core of the Establishment Clause prevents government 
actions that divide people in this way. The Establishment Clause is about 
preventing the majority, through government power, from making members 
 
89  Id. at 870 (footnote omitted). 
90  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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of other religions feel unwelcome. The Establishment Clause does not 
prevent people from praying; it merely prevents the infusion of religion in 
government events and on government property. People, of course, have the 
right to pray and listen to prayers, but not at an official government 
function, especially one where the audience is compelled to be present. 
The problem is much more significant than it was when the First 
Amendment was adopted because the country is far more religiously 
diverse in the twenty-first century than it was in 1791. Justice Brennan 
observed: 
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were 
our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today 
the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does 
substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who 
worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no God at 
all.91 
This explains why religious symbols do not belong on government 
property. A city hall with a large cross on its roof makes those of different 
religions feel unwelcome, or feel that it is not their government. At the oral 
argument in Van Orden v. Perry,92 Justice Kennedy asked me why those 
who do not like the Ten Commandments monument at the seat of the Texas 
state government cannot simply avert their eyes. My response was that this 
has no stopping point—a city could put a large Latin cross atop its roof, or 
many crosses, and simply proclaim that those who do not like it should 
avert their eyes. Not looking does not make the constitutional problem go 
away. A cross atop city hall violates the Establishment Clause even if 
people remember to avert their eyes. 
This, of course, is only a partial defense of a wall separating church 
and state. But it explains why I believe that Justice Stevens was correct and 
why I hope that someday his view will again be accepted by a majority of 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Much is written in this symposium about Justice Stevens’s views of the 
Constitution and his approach to specific issues. In this Essay, I have 
focused on one particular topic: his views about the Establishment Clause. 
But one crucial aspect of what he brought to the Court must not be 
overlooked: his tremendous decency. It is reflected in how he treated every 
lawyer who appeared before him. It is reflected in the way in which he 
interacted with his colleagues on the bench, never displaying the slightest 
 
91  Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
And, of course, the country has become even more religiously diverse in the past half century since this 
was written. 
92  545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
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anger or rancor, no matter how much he disagreed or even was provoked. It 
is reflected in his opinions, which never resorted to the sarcasm or ridicule 
that has become all too prevalent in recent years. 
At a time in which in our nation seems so bitterly divided and nasty 
rhetoric is present everywhere, including in Supreme Court opinions, 
Justice Stevens is truly a role model for all of us. 
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